The credibility problems of monetary policy are enlarged by transmission lags whenever the welfare criterion consists of arguments with di¤ering transmission lags. If, as usually argued, prices react to monetary policy with a longer lag than output, the discretionary bias is substantially increased under a consumer welfare maximizing policy criterion ( ‡exible in ‡ation targeting) in the prototype New Keynesian model. Money growth targeting can signi…cantly reduce the discretionary bias, but is not robust to other speci…cations of welfare with higher valuation of output stability.
Introduction
Since Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) we have known that an overly ambitious monetary policy which aims to bring output above the natural level is associated with in ‡ation and stabilization biases. If the central bank tries to systematically exploit the short-run trade o¤ between output and in ‡ation, it will lead to higher in ‡ation, and output and in ‡ation being stabilized sub-optimally. Furthermore, due to the lack of commitment to future policies, discretionary policymaking is unable to appropriately in ‡uence expectations about the future. At the time policy is implemented, the advantages of the future commitment may already have been realized and the policymaker has incentives to deviate from the pre-announced policy. In the absence of commitment technology, the best thing a policymaker can do is to re-optimize policy in every period. Since people form expectations rationally, this will be anticipated and the only equilibrium is that of the time-consistent optimal discretionary equilibrium which may perform considerably worse than the optimal commitment policy. This paper studies the impact of delayed e¤ects of monetary policy on the economy in the discretionary equilibrium. Delayed e¤ects are commonly referred to as the transmission lags of monetary policy. It is almost universally accepted that monetary policy is subject to rather long transmission lags and that they create various challenges for monetary policy. In this paper we show that if the transmission lags are caused by implementation lags in the private sector, the credibility problems of a welfare-maximizing policymaker that acts under discretion increase. Under the reasonable assumption that pricing decisions of the …rms are subject to longer implementation lags than household consumption decisions, the discretionary policy involves no policy-induced stabilization of cost-push shocks in the canonical New Keynesian model. 1 The argument is simple: at the horizon the policymaker can a¤ect output gap, in ‡ation (and prices) are already predetermined. The best discretionary policy is then to fully stabilize the output gap. The implementation lags have a severe impact on the discretionary equilibrium in particular if the cost-push shocks are persistent.
We argue that when society attaches little weight on output stabilisation, adopting a single target for monetary policy, thus having a strict (as opposed to ‡exible) monetary policy, eliminates the additional credibility problems caused by di¤ering transmission lags. The central bank does not get tempted in deviating from the main nominal target. Our result con…rms the results in Söderström (2005) who argues that there is a role for money growth targeting in reducing the discretionary bias. We also show that the relative bene…ts of money growth targeting over in ‡ation increases when there is an implementation lag in prices. Our results support the Friedman (1960) conjecture that lags in the transmission mechanism could be a reason for adopting money growth targeting, yet this result is not robust to alternative speci…cations of welfare with higher valuation of output stability. Furthermore, the argument for money growth targeting should be balanced by the potential for instability of money demand.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 present the canonical New Keynesian model and section 3 derives the optimal discretionary policy strategies under both discretion and commitment. Section 4 discusses most important alternative policy regimes that o¤er a potential remedy to discretionary bias. Welfare comparisons are then made in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
The model
The private-sector pricing decisions are carried out within the Calvo (1983) framework. In each period the …rm has a …xed probability of changing its price. The …rm sets prices in order to maximize pro…ts under the condition that it might not be able to adjust prices in the next period. In addition, we assume that there is a j-period implementation lag of prices, i.e. prices are set in advance of the actual implementation. This could be due to staggering of wage and/or price contracts or because of information delays. 2 This leads to the New Keynesian Phillips curve (see Roberts (1995) and Woodford (2003) ) given by
where t+j p t+j p t+j 1 is in ‡ation at time t + j, x t+jjt is the output gap at time t + j, is the representative agent's discount factor and " t+j is a cost-push shock that represents other factors that in ‡uence price setting at time t + j; not considered at time t. 3 These factors can be surprise movements in the mark-up of prices. 4 The parameter is a convolution of the model's deep parameters and it captures a sensitivity of in ‡ation to output gap.
The Euler consumption equation, when combined appropriately with the households' labour supply choice and product market equilibrium condition, gives rise to an expectational IS-curve of the form (see, e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) , McCallum and Nelson (1999) and Woodford (2003)) x t+m = x t+m+1jt i t+mjt t+m+1jt r n t+m ;
(2) in case where there is an m-period implementation lag in consumption decisions. 5 r n t+m denotes the natural real interest rate at time t + m and is taken as exogenous process by households. is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Consumption and pricing decisions being predetermined for some period of time implies that in ‡ation and output are less forward looking than in the standard NK model.
The model has been extensively studied by Woodford (2003) and Clarida et al. (1999) , and by Svensson and Woodford (2005) in the case of j = m = 1 period implementation lags. Furthermore, Woodford (2003, chapter 8 ) studies the case with j = m = s, where s is any arbitrary, positive number. In this paper, we assume that j > m, i.e. that the implementation lag of prices may be either longer or equal to that of output gap. Based on evidence from VAR models (e.g., Christiano et al., 2005) and other empirical models (e.g., Rudebusch, 2002a,b) , it is in fact reasonable to assume that in ‡ation and output gap respond to changes in monetary policy with di¤erent delays. Such di¤erences in delays are also featured in several theoretical models of the monetary transmission mechanism (see, e.g., Svensson, 1997) . The traditional forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips curve without implementation lags suggests that in ‡ation responds simultaneously with changes in output gap. Considering the empirical evidence, such a feature seems unrealistic and any policy advice hinging on this could be problematic. By allowing for implementation lags, however, the NK model can generate plausible equilibrium responses where output gap precedes in ‡ation movements, see, e.g. Woodford (2003, section 3.12) . term in the NK Phillips curve. Our framework emphasizes information delays as another and possibly complementing explanation of the lagged e¤ect of monetary policy on prices.
3 For any variable z, we use the notation that z t+djt Etz t+d ; where Et is mathematical expectation operator, t denotes the time when expectations are formed and d is it the time forward operator. 4 We follow Svensson and Woodford (2005) in assuming that the cost-push shock has an immediate in ‡uence on pricing. Note that this assumption is not important for the conclusions regarding the credibility problems of monetary policy in this paper. 5 Woodford (2003, ch. 5) provides detailed discussion on complications that may arise from combining the models where consumption and pricing behavior are subject to decision lags in NK framework. Our setup here is consistent with microfoundations to the extent that we have assumed j m: 3 3. The welfare maximizing monetary policy
We study …rst the monetary policy regime where the central bank maximizes welfare directly. In this framework, the central bank's dynamic optimization problem can be written as
(3)
is the period social loss function and E t0 1 P t=t0 t t0 L t is the expected discounted loss. Woodford (2003) shows that the period loss in (4) represents a quadratic approximation to (the negative of) consumer welfare given that = 1 is a function of the elasticity of substitution between alternative di¤erentiated goods ( ) and elasticity of in ‡ation with respect to output gap ( ). Thus minimizing the expected discounted loss produces the welfare maximizing equilibrium up to a quadratic approximation. 6 Svensson (1997) denotes this monetary policy as ‡exible in ‡ation targeting since the loss function includes arguments in addition to in ‡ation. The central bank's instrument is the nominal interest rate at time t + m, since this is the relevant time period when the central bank can have an e¤ect on output gap and hence on in ‡ation (see equations (1) and (2)).
The Lagrangian associated with this problem is given by
Note that the the objective function does not give any guidance as to how to set the level of the interest rate during the "pre-planning" period [t 0 ; t 0 + m 1]: It only provides a criteria on how to set the optimal announcement of the interest rate m periods ahead. As noted by Svensson and Woodford (2005) , however, the unforecastable component of the interest rate (i t+m i t+mjt ) in ‡uences neither of the target variables. Nor has the policymaker any incentives to deviate from the announcement and to produce surprises. Correspondingly, we assume that the policymaker sets the unforecastable part of interest rate to zero. The policymaker implements the interest rate policy therefore by setting i t+m = i t+mjt :
Discretion
Under the assumption that the central bank does not have access to commitment technology, the relevant policy regime is the one where the central bank optimizes its policy period by period. This situation is usually referred to as a discretionary policy regime. The policy problem under discretion can be solved analytically by …nding the …rst-order conditions to the Lagrangian function (5) with respect to in ‡ation, output and the interest rate at the horizon monetary policy can have an e¤ect (the length of the implementation lags) on the economy, and by taking expectations as given. The …rst-order conditions are given by
Assuming that > 0 (and that j m); the …rst-order conditions (6)-(9) imply that for every period t t 0 ;
x t+mjt = 0; for j > m; and x t+mjt = t+mjt ; for j = m:
Equations (1) and (10) determine the path for in ‡ation and (expected) output gap. The policy rule for the future interest rate can be derived using equations (2) and (10):
i t+mjt = t+m+1jt + r n t+mjt ; for j > m; and i t+mjt = 1 + t+mjt t+m+1jt + r n t+mjt ; for j = m:
Note that if j > m > 1; the output gap and in ‡ation are both predetermined from the perspective of the policymaker for the "pre-planning" period of [t 0 ; t 0 + m 1] and [t 0 ; t 0 + j 1] respectively. In the pre-planning period, output and in ‡ation are entirely determined by the cost-push and natural rate shocks respectively and not by the central bank's decisions at time t. Equations in (11) determine the optimal policy "announcements" m period in advance of policy implementation.
The optimality conditions in (10) show that the optimal monetary policy in the discretionary equilibrium depends on the relative length of the implementation lags. When in ‡ation is predetermined for a longer time than output gap (j > m), the interest rate is set with the intention of keeping the real interest rate equal to its natural rate at the relevant policy horizon. The reason for this is that at the time policy is being announced, in ‡ation is predetermined, and the central bank has no incentives to pay attention to in ‡ation determination within the period. The policymaker does not trade o¤ any output gap variability with in ‡ation variability and there are no stabilization of cost-push shocks. Hence, it is optimal to fully stabilise the output gap. In the case with implementation lags of equal length (j = m), however, the central bank in ‡uences output gap and in ‡ation in the same period. Thus the monetary authority trades o¤ in ‡ation expectations with output gap expectations without having to commit to future policies.
Commitment
If the central bank is able to commit, the solution to the problem is found by …nding the …rst order conditions the same way as under discretion, but also taking into account of the e¤ects of policy on expectations.
The …rst-order conditions are then
where the initial Lagrange multipliers are t0+u 1 = t0+n 1 = 0 for u 2 [0; ::; j] and n 2 [0; ::; m] : These conditions imply that for > 0, the optimal plan will be given by
and
The reason why the plan implies stabilizing the output gap perfectly for the …rst periods within the planning horizon, is that in ‡ation is predetermined over this period and the central bank plan for the output gap does not in ‡uence the pricing decisions. The best solution is then to perfectly stabilize the output gap during the periods when in ‡ation is pre-determined. This is clearly seen in Figures ?? and ? ? that show the equilibrium responses of in ‡ation and output to cost push shocks in the model with one period implementation lag in pricing and no implementation lag in output: under commitment, output gap is perfectly stabilised in the …rst period and with no reaction of the output gap to cost push shock.
Note that in if j > m > 1; the output gap and in ‡ation are both predetermined as in the discretionary case above.
The e¤ ects of implementation lag
Before turning into comparing di¤erent policy regimes and discussing potential remedies for the discretionary policy, it is useful to look more closely to the e¤ect of implementation lags on in ‡ation and output gap and how the cost-push shock in ‡uences these variables in the optimal discretionary equilibrium.
We focus on the special case where in ‡ation reacts to changes in monetary policy with one period greater lag than output gap such that j = 1 and m = 0. We contrast this to the case without implementation lags (j = m = 0). In the case with implementation lags, the solution for the output gap under discretion is given from equation (10) as
x t = 0: The …rst-order di¤erence equation for in ‡ation can then be found by using (10) in equation (1). This results in
Under the assumption that the cost-push shock follows AR(1) process,
the forward solution for in ‡ation can be found by using the fact that t+1 = t+1jt + " t+1 " t+1jt and solving forward for t+1jt : This yields
where" t+1 " t+1 " t+1jt .
In the standard case where j = m = 0; the solution for output gap under discretion is given by equations (1), (10) and (19) yielding
The forward solution for in ‡ation is found by combining equations (1) and (21), and equation with AR(1) speci…cation of cost-push shock yielding
The equilibrium behavior of the models with and without the implementation lag di¤er in two important respects. The …rst di¤erence is related to the expectations channel. In the model with the implementation lag, the only immediate e¤ect is a one-to-one 7 reaction of in ‡ation to the surprise component of the cost-push shock" t+1 , ref. the …rst term in equation (20). Thus, in ‡ation does not respond immediately to the expected future e¤ect of the surprise as it does in the model without implementation lags (see equation (22)). In the model with implementation lags, the remaining e¤ect is delayed by one period, ref. the second term in (20). However, only a part " of the surprise shock survives until the second period and then a¤ects the in ‡ation path through the expectations channel as …rms reoptimize prices given new information about the future path of marginal costs. This delayed e¤ect reduces in ‡ation variability in the model with implementation lag. The reduction is particularly large when the cost-push shocks have a little persistence, i.e. " is small. The expectation channel is then relatively unimportant for in ‡ation determination.
The second type of di¤erence regards optimal policy under the two models. As noted above, the monetary policymaker does not respond by adjusting output gap in the case with the implementation lag and hence in ‡ation is not insulated from the cost-push shock. In the absence of implementation lag, the monetary policymaker is able to trade o¤ some of the in ‡ation variability with output gap variability in response to the cost-push shock.
The monetary policy channel has a stronger impact on in ‡ation if the persistence of the cost-push shock ( " ) is large. If cost-push shocks are persistent and monetary policymaker does not stabilize the cost-push shock, the price setters expect marginal costs to be high for a long time. Hence, they increase today's prices at a faster rate and current in ‡ation reacts strongly to the cost-push shock.
The e¤ects on in ‡ation are summarized by equation (23). It shows that in ‡ation is a function of four terms in the model without implementation lags. The …rst two terms correspond to in ‡ation in the model with the implementation lag. The third term represents the additional e¤ect on in ‡ation through the expectation channel and the fourth term represents the e¤ect of a policy that insulates in ‡ation from the cost-push shock.
Potential solutions to the credibility problem
The credibility problem of monetary policy can be alleviated by delegating monetary policy to a central bank with a modi…ed loss function. Svensson and Woodford (2005) show that if the implementation lags of in ‡ation and output gap both are equal to one, including the revision of the (one period ahead) in ‡ation forecast in the social loss function with a weight corresponding to the loss caused by a marginal increase in the in ‡ation forecasts (in optimum), produces a solution that replicates the timeless commitment solution. Although we do not argue against the possibility that there may be a modi…ed extension to the loss function that can reduce the discretionary bias in the case of di¤ering implementation lags too, the extension would however be highly model dependent. Furthermore, as Svensson and Woodford (2005) also note, such a solution to the discretionary problem involves "a somewhat abstract consideration for the purposes of practical policymaking". Since we view implementability of the solution as essential, we do not explore this venue any further and restrict the analysis by only considering regimes that seem realistic alternatives to ‡exible in ‡ation targeting.
The bene…ts of price-level targeting versus in ‡ation targeting have been discussed by Vestin (2006) . He shows that price-level targeting under discretion can produce an outcome that replicates in ‡ation targeting under commitment. Price level targeting may 8 in many respects represent an improvement over in ‡ation targeting, not only because it reduces the credibility problem of the central bank, but also because it is easily implementable and it is indeed a practical alternative to in ‡ation targeting. It does not, however, in its ‡exible form alleviate the credibility problems caused by implementation lags for the same reason as above: prices are predetermined at the horizon the policymaker can a¤ect the output gap.
Strict targeting regimes
A standard argument favouring strict targeting regimes is that their alleviate the credibility problems since the concentration is on only one objective. This removes the temptation to deviate from the commitment to the main target variable. There are essentially only three candidate solutions for a strict targeting regime: in ‡ation, pricelevel or money growth targeting. The period loss functions are given respectively by
for these targeting regimes. In what follows, we discuss the properties of these regimes under implementation lag in pricing.
Strict in ‡ation and price-level targeting
For the particular case of strict in ‡ation targeting (where = 0), the …rst order conditions in equations (6) to (9) imply that for every period t t 0 ; t+jjt = 0:
The solution for output gap is given by combining this optimality condition with equation (1) to have
Comparing this solution to the one under ‡exible in ‡ation targeting, obtained in equation (10), there is a discontinuity in the monetary policy strategy at = 0 whenever j > m. Under strict in ‡ation targeting, the central bank achieves perfect stability of in ‡ation expectations at horizon j whereas for any small positive value of ; only the output gap is stabilized at horizon m since the occurrence of the output gap in the loss function introduces a temptation for the central bank to deviate from the in ‡ation forecast target.
A similar argument goes for strict price-level targeting. The …rst-order conditions imply that for t t 0 ; p t+jjt = 0:
The solution for output gap is again given by combining this optimality condition with equation (1) to have
The solution strategy allows to determine forecast of the output gap at horizon t + j and after for both in ‡ation and price-level targeting, but it does not allow to determine, in the case of j > m, output gap for horizon m to j 1. Over this horizon, the central bank does have an e¤ect on in ‡ation and output gap, but the target criterion does not give any guidance how to set the interest rate. In particular, the targeting criterion is silent on how to respond to new information that impacts present period output gap.
In order to come up with a way of determining the output gap for horizon m to j 1, we need specify how the monetary policymaker responds to the part of the new information that is irrelevant from the perspective of the j-period ahead forecast but relevant for the periods before in which policy has an in ‡uence on output. There are many potential solutions to this problem as the CB in principle could respond in an in…nite number of ways. One solution stands out, however. This solution implies that the central bank responds to the part of the new information by stabilizing output at the horizon [m; j 1]. This is the solution that would maximize welfare under strict targeting. We denote these targeting regimes as "augmented strict targeting" under implementation lag in pricing. It could however be argued that such an augmented regime constitutes a contradicting of itself: it implicitly assumes preferences over output. In which case it is considered a ‡exible in ‡ation targeting regime and its solution should apply. We nevertheless present the result from the simulation of such a regime below. 7
Money growth targeting
Money growth targeting was originally promoted by Friedman (1960) partly due to the perceived problems associated with transmission lags. Friedman warned against trying to stabilize prices and in ‡ation directly in a discretionary manner due to long and variable lags in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
[...] the link between price changes and monetary changes over short periods is too loose and too imperfectly known to make price level stability an objective and reasonably unambiguous guide to policy. [...] [T]here is much evidence that monetary changes have their e¤ect only after a considerable lag and over a long period and that the lag is rather variable. (p. 87) He instead promoted the well-known k % money growth rule:
[T]he stock of money [should] be increased at a …xed rate year-in and year-out without any variation in the rate of increase to meet cyclical needs. (p. 90) Friedman argued that discretionary policymaking aiming to stabilize in ‡ation could potentially be destabilizing due to imperfect knowledge about the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, including its lag structure. Although imperfect knowledge is not the reason why transmission lags of monetary policy creates credibility problems analysed in his paper, the money growth targeting strategy does o¤er some robustness to di¤erent lag speci…cations since its strategy will be independent of the lag structure of the economy. 8 Furthermore, and as noted above, money growth targeting (or the "Friedman's k % rule") does not involve the potential temptation to deviate from the announced policy as is the case under the welfare optimizing regime ( ‡exible in ‡ation targeting). Importantly, Söderström (2005) discusses the bene…ts of money growth targeting in the New Keynesian framework as a solution to the credibility problem. For these reasons, we investigate how transmission lags in ‡uences money growth targeting as a solution to the credibility problem.
In order to derive the interest rate implications of money growth targeting, we assume that the demand for money is given by a conventional money demand function 9
By subtracting real money balancesm t 1 m t 1 p t 1 from both sides, the growth rate of money supply is given by
Under money growth targeting, the central bank chooses m t = 0: The interest rate then follows from (29) and is given by
As noted above, we see that the interest rate under money growth targeting rule is independent of the length of the transmission lags.
Welfare and the discretionary bias
In this section we study the e¤ects on social loss of implementation lags in pricing decisions and compare it to the standard model with no implementation lag.
We let the disturbances to the output gap and money demand equations follow the AR(1) processes such that r n t+1 = r r n t +r n t+1 ;
As noted above, " t is a cost-push shock, r n t is a shock to the natural rate of interest and v t is a money demand shock. We calibrate the model according to Giannoni and Woodford (2005) by setting = 0:99, = 0:024, = 0:16, r = 0:35, and r = 0:0372. Since Giannoni and Woodford (2005) do not produce calibrated values for the parameters in the cost-push shock process, we set " = 0:01 and " = 0:5 in the standard calibration of the model: We also consider other degrees of persistence of the cost push shock " in the model below. For the parameters in the money demand equation (28), we have used the estimates from Kilponen and Leitemo (2008) . Using the US data 10 over the period 1980q1 2004q4, we obtained an estimate of = 0:43 with a coe¢ cient standard error of 0:11. 11 Moreover, the estimated parameter values of the disturbance processes are v = 0:77 and v = 0:0116. Finally, the elasticity of substitution between alternative di¤erentiated goods ( ) is parameterized as 1 = 0:13 as in Woodford (2003) . This implies that in ‡ation is the component of the welfare loss that dominates, and social loss can be studied primarily by the impact on in ‡ation.
Maximizing consumer welfare
We compute the welfare loss under the discretionary and commitment equilibria. Furthermore, we illustrate the importance of the persistence of cost push shocks by analyzing the two models with two alternative assumptions about the persistence of cost push shock. Results as regards welfare losses are presented in Table 1 . Figures 1-5 in appendix B show the equilibrium responses of the models under di¤erent policies and assumptions about the persistence of cost-push shocks.
For our baseline speci…cation of welfare = 1 and persistence of the cost-push shocks of ( " = 0:5), there are substantial bene…ts in having access to commitment technology if the central bank is maximizing welfare directly through in ‡ation targeting. The welfare loss is 73 per cent higher with discretion in the standard model. The gains from committing are slightly lower under the model with the implementation lag -the loss is now 52 per cent higher than under commitment. Commitment is more important in the setting without implementation lag since the expectations channel has a stronger in ‡uence on the outcome, as discussed previously. The relative loss of discretion increases with a higher degree of persistence in the cost-push shock ( " = 0:7). Discretion produces welfare losses that is 123 per cent and 258 per cent higher than under commitment in the model with and without the implementation lag respectively. The presence of an implementation lag now worsens the discretionary equilibrium substantially. Since the shock is expected to have a more persistent e¤ect on costs, the control of expectations channel via the appropriate design of monetary policy is vital to the outcome. Such a control is not available to the policymaker in the discretionary equilibrium.
As noted in the previous section, the persistence of the cost-push shock in ‡uences whether or not lags in the model improve on the relative performance of the discretionary policy. With the baseline assumption of " = 0:5, a lag will in fact improve on the relative performance of discretion. This is a result of …rms not accounting for the future e¤ect of the shock in the period in which the shock occurs which has a moderating e¤ect on in ‡ation, and thus on welfare loss. This e¤ect outweighs the e¤ect of a missing monetary policy channel on in ‡ation. However, this result is overturned if the cost-push shock becomes su¢ ciently persistent ( " = 0:7).
The central bank can improve signi…cantly on the outcome with money growth targeting. This is in particular evident in the model with the implementation lag, where loss is only 12 per cent above the optimal commitment equilibrium as opposed to 52 per cent in the model without lags. The model supports the claim by Friedman that money growth targeting is welfare improving in particular if there are transmission lags in monetary policy, but for a di¤erent reason: Money growth targeting alleviates the problem caused by a lack of credibility with discretionary in ‡ation-targeting policy.
Although the performance of money growth targeting deteriorates relative to the optimal commitment policy with increased cost-push persistence ( " = 0:7), it improves relative to the discretionary in ‡ation targeting equilibrium. With increased persistence and the implementation lag, money growth targeting reduces the loss (relative to in ‡ation targeting under discretion) by 61 percent compared to 28 percent in the case with baseline persistence. The corresponding numbers are 21 percent and 12 percent in the model without the implementation lag.
The bene…ts of money growth targeting is due to its ability to induce history dependence in policymaking. As can be seen from the implied interest rate rule in (30), money growth targeting features history dependence through the terms x t andm t 1 : 12 Such a history dependent policy a¤ects people's expectations about the future. This can improve the equilibrium substantially in a model where these expectations play a major role. Figures 1-4 in appendix A.2 show the equilibrium responses of the model to a cost-push shock. The response under money growth targeting bears relatively close resemblance to that of the optimal commitment policy. It produces hump-shaped output gap and in ‡ation responses that re ‡ect the history-dependence of the policy under both the commitment and money growth rule. Why does history dependence contribute to an improved outcome? Under both money growth targeting and the commitment equilibrium, the price level is (trend) stationary. Under money growth targeting prices will over time return to the money growth path. A cost-push shock that raises in ‡ation today will lead to people expecting future in ‡ation to be relatively low as to get prices in line with money. Lower long term expectations of in ‡ation has a moderating e¤ect on current short term in ‡ation expectations and this has a stabilizing e¤ect on in ‡ation process.
Money growth targeting does not exactly replicate the commitment solution, however, and is furthermore ine¢ ciently a¤ected by money demand shocks 13 that induce variability in the interest rate. The variability in the interest rate induces ine¢ cient movements in output gap which in turn a¤ects in ‡ation. In the case with implementation lags on prices, however, the initial shock to money demand has no impact on in ‡ation since prices are predetermined. This reduces the ine¢ cient impact of the money demand shock since only a part of the money demand shock survives into the future and can a¤ect in ‡ation. This is the reason why the e¢ ciency of money growth targeting increases with the implementation lag.
Neither strict in ‡ation nor price-level targeting do particularly well in either of the speci…cations. The reason is that output gets very volatile (see also Figure 5 in appendix B) and despite a small weight on output stability in the welfare speci…cation, this has a strong e¤ect on welfare. Strict price-level targeting is worse than direct optimization of welfare under discretion in all four model speci…cations. In particular, it does badly in the case with an implementation lag. The reason is that the central bank is not able to stabilize in ‡ation perfectly due to the implementation lag. The central bank needs to reverse any e¤ects of the price level due to shocks during the implementation period by creating either negative or positive in ‡ation. This implies strong volatility in in ‡ation. The bene…cial e¤ect on in ‡ation expectations caused by price-level targeting as noted by Vestin (2006) are not su¢ cient to outweigh these other e¤ects.
Strict in ‡ation targeting does somewhat better. Indeed, it improves on the discretionary welfare maximizing policy when there is an implementation lag and persistence in the cost-push shock is su¢ ciently high. The equilibrium produces about twice the loss of the commitment equilibrium. A robustness check with both higher ( " = 0:9) and lower ( " = 0:3) cost-push shock persistence (but keeping the variance constant) reported in 3, suggests that strict in ‡ation targeting may do quite well and even improve on monetary growth targeting if persistence is su¢ ciently high. This is also true for price-level targeting in a model without the implementation lag. For the other regimes, the analysis suggests that the qualitative conclusions remain intact.
Alternative welfare speci…cation
Although the above welfare criterion re ‡ects consumer welfare in the model, it could be argued that policy values output gap stability too little. Central banks seem to value output gap stability more than above, as the output gap is empirically more stable than policies based on the above criterion would suggest. In the analysis below, we have set = 0:5, implying that society values in ‡ation stability only twice as important as output gap stability.
Valuing a more stable output gap changes the results in important ways (see Table 2 ). First of all, the discretionary welfare maximizing policy does much better than before. For the standard model, the ine¢ ciencies of discretionary policy of stabilizing in ‡ation is relatively less important now since the relative weight on in ‡ation in welfare is smaller. For the model with an implementation lag, the policy of making output completely stable is more valued and therefore the di¤erence to the commitment equilibrium is smaller.
The performance of the money growth targeting regime is now far worse since much more emphasis is put on the regime's ability to stabilize output. The money growth targeting regimes is no longer a good remedy for the credibility problems associated with the model, neither with or without the implementation lag. Neither is a remedy needed as much since the discretionary equilibrium is much closer to the commitment equilibrium. The strict in ‡ation and price-level targeting regimes are now disastrous since they imply far too much output gap variability in comparison to society's desire. An identical robustness check over di¤erent degrees of persistence as above is reported in Table 4 .
Conclusions
It is well established that monetary policy is subject to transmission lags. These lags can be the results of delayed responses of the private sector to economic shocks. We show under the reasonable assumption that when in ‡ation reacts with a longer lag than output gap to changes in monetary policy, the optimal discretionary equilibrium implies no policy-induced stabilization of cost-push shocks. Since in ‡ation is predetermined at the time when monetary policy can in ‡uence output gap, the discretionary optimizing policymaker stabilize the output gap perfectly and does not stabilize in ‡ation. This result can be generalized as to having policy only stabilizing the target variable with the shortest transmission lag.
For standard speci…cation of welfare we …nd that implementation lags in prices increase the discretionary stabilization bias severely if cost-push shocks are su¢ ciently persistent. Money growth targeting reduces the bias substantially, since it features history dependence, similarly to the policy under commitment equilibrium. For the alternative speci…cation of welfare that values output far more, however, the discretionary bias is substantially smaller and money growth targeting does not o¤er a remedy for reducing the discretionary bias. In fact it does substantially worse.
For either speci…cations, strict targeting of in ‡ation or the price-level does not produce a good outcome. If there are implementation lags, strict price-level targeting seems to be particularly detrimental to the economy.
Appendix A. The state space representation
The model is solved using standard numerical solution methods (Svensson and Woodford (2003) ) for rational expectations models. These solutions methods require the setting up of the model in state space form. For the standard case with no implementation lags, the state space form is relatively straight forward and is not shown here. For the case with implementation lags, the state space is more complicated. Here we show the state space form with a one-period implementation lags for prices (j = 1; m = 0). The state space takes the form 
